[Generic Competitive Position Analysis 2/2]
In this second part of Generic Competitive Position
Analysis, the PAP has good chance to retain two-third majority in 2016. However, their huge economic profits will be
reduced, no more 90% parliament seats. 2016 will also see one big PAP circle,
one mid-size WP circle and few small circles.
Table 2 Performance of PAP and selected opposition parties in GE2011 (%
of valid votes in contested wards)
GElection
|
PAP
|
WP
|
NSP
|
SDP
|
GE2011
|
60.14%
|
46.6%
|
39.3%
|
36.8%
|
GE2006
|
66.6%
|
38.4%
|
-
|
23.2%
|
Source:
Singapore-election.com
Table 3 Credibility of Selected Political Parties (IPS Post-GE Survey)
Mean
|
PAP
|
WP
|
NSP
|
SDP
|
2006
|
4.1
|
3.6
|
-
|
2.3
|
2011
|
3.9
|
3.6
|
3.0
|
2.9
|
Source:
Institute of Policy Studies, Singapore
Table 2 and Table 3 show that the main challenge for
the PAP is WP. The average percentage votes that WP received in their contested
wards in 2011 were quite close (46.6%) to the PAP and it is well ahead of other
opposition parties. In term of
credibility, WP is also catching up (3.6 against 3.9 for the PAP). Again, WP’s credibility is also ahead of
other opposition parties.
WP’s weakness is it is a regional party. It has yet to
reach out to the whole of Singapore. It only contested 23 seats in the
parliament in 2011. By 2016 or 2017, it
is very unlikely they will contest all the (87) parliament seats. The party has
clearly stated that they are not ready to take over the government and wants to
concentrate on building their power base in the eastern part of Singapore with plan
to buy a space for its headquarters. WP seems to admit they have yet to realize
the full benefits of learning curve.
The generic competitive position for WP, strategically
speaking, will be continued to be in focused low-cost and niche markets in 2016.
As a strategy consideration, as they don’t want to
form the government, they will most likely not contesting more than 51% of the
seats, i.e. 44 seat under the current 87- seat parliament. In 2016, WP will
certainly contest more wards than 2011 but may purposely choose to contest less
than 50% of the seats.
The two recent by-elections (http://www.singapore-elections.com/parl-2012-be/ and http://www.singapore-elections.com/parl-2013-be/) in 2012 and 2013 were won by WP. This clearly shows the popularity of the
party in the eastern side of Singapore. The 2013 by-election showed a swing of
10% towards WP making the party capturing one more parliament seat.
Besides WP, the other opposition parties will need to
catch up in average percentage votes obtained, credibility and popularity.
There is a wider gap between the PAP and these opposition parties. They may
have some ‘wildcat’ breakthroughs but the impact will be limited. This is why
freak election result may not happen in the next election.
The political strategic maps in Singapore in the next
election in 2016 will look like the followings:
(Assuming the x- and y-axis as average percentage votes and credibility,
and the third factor is number of seats contested)
PAP is the only big circle contesting
all the seats, with high average percentage votes and credibility. They are
adopting integrated strategies and want to maintain cost leader and
differentiation competitive position.
WP is the only mid-size circle contesting less than half of the seats, coming closer and matching the
PAP in average percentage votes and credibility. But their competitive position
will be different from the PAP. They will look for niche market and low-cost focused
segment.
Other opposition parties will form different small
circles with weaker positions in average percentage votes and credibility. Some
may contest as many seats as WP and as a result, the election may see more
multi-corner competitions.
One thing to note, Singapore
parliament election is “first pass the post’ system. There is only one winner in the contested
constituency. Candidates backed by
parties with lower average percentage votes and credibility will have
disadvantages in winning a contest, no matter how many candidates they are sponsoring
in the election.
Assuming WP only contests in 40 seats in the next
election and they manage to improve their average percentage votes to 50% in
their contested seats, this will give WP 20 seats in the parliament. In addition to some ‘wildcat’ breakthroughs
by other opposition parties, the total seats lost to the oppositions may be
26.
The PAP’s average percent votes will reduce to below
60%, say 55%. A 55% popular votes produces 70% seats in the parliament, the PAP
is still enjoying economic profits. If WP contests fewer seats than 40 or bring
in low quality candidates, then the seats lost to WP will be less. The PAP will regain more economic profits,
with less than 60% popular votes but enjoying 80% of the parliament seats.
Table 4: Possible PAP majority and seats in the parliament
PAP Majority in parliament
|
Total seats
|
PAP MPs
|
PAP MPs %
|
Oppositions MPs
|
2011
|
87
|
81
|
93%
|
6
|
Two-third
|
87
|
58
|
66.7%
|
29
|
70%
|
87
|
61
|
70%
|
26
|
75%
|
87
|
66
|
75%
|
21
|
80%
|
87
|
70
|
80%
|
17
|
85%
|
87
|
74
|
85%
|
13
|
# assuming there are no change in total seats in 2016
A win-win situation (?) may be the PAP having economic
profits at 75%-80% level of parliament seats with slightly few than 60% popular
votes. The PAP still has the two-third majority and the oppositions start to
gain substantial seats in the parliament. From here, they can work out broader
strategies to deny the PAP in the next election.
The evolving process for Singapore politics is
incremental. Although it is marching towards normality, however, it is yet to
achieve full open competition environment and so normal profits are still a
distance away in 2016.
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